

that they hold little real promise and that today, at least, "We are not witnessing a Greek tragedy but an international farce." The judgment is harsh, but so is life, and it is intended to wake the dreamer from his reverie. The choice before us, according to Strachey, is this:

"Either we must pursue the dusty, arduous, and complex tasks of finding some sort of way in which men may live in peace in the nuclear age, since they can no longer live at war, or we must wash our hands of the rough ugly business of the real world and how it may be preserved." Rail though we may at the fates which force us to play so dirty and desperate a game, our only hope is to play it well and, in so doing, buy the time we need to shape the vision all men of good will seek.

An essential element of that vision will be a world authority. A center of power will have to exist somewhere in any future world, and it is to be hoped that that center can be the United Nations. But as far into the future as we can see, the United Nations will continue to be a collection of competing sovereign states unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty to a central authority. "The United Nations," Strachey says, "must become the instrument of world peace; but it must have a sword in hand, and in our time at least the sword can be only the sword of one or more of the super-powers." If these be the realities of power, then we had best face the problem and find an answer to it.

What is the answer? It lies, according to Strachey, in a coalition of states that join together in common bond out of shared concerns in the defense of peace. Such a coalition might include just America and Russia, or five or six powers. There are a number of areas of common interest which could provide the basis for agreement and the evolution of a rudimentary world authority. Those who see the nuclear test ban treaty as mere window dressing would do well to study carefully its implications in this regard.



Some measure of the intellectual discipline and energy which will be

required to meet the challenge of disarmament can be gained from *Disarmament and the Economy*, a collection of essays edited by Emile Benoit of Columbia University and Kenneth Boulding of the Center of Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan. Because it is the most comprehensive look at this problem taken to date, expressing the opinions of a large number of economists, it is unquestionably an authoritative and valuable piece of work. The authors have concluded that we *can* solve the economic problems of disarmament, and—if true—this is certainly a significant finding. Yet there are two important questions which have either been entirely ignored by the authors or passed over lightly, and which appear to be so basic to the whole issue that they should be raised.

First, what this nation *can* do to meet the crisis of disarmament and what it *will* do are two entirely different things. The importance of this observation becomes clearer if we consider some of the following programs which the authors believe provide alternative uses for funds now tied up in defense efforts:

	billion/annum
ENDING SERIOUS POVERTY	\$6.8-8.8
INDUSTRIAL PLANT & EQUIPMENT	16.3
HEALTH	7.8
EDUCATION	11.6
HOUSING	4.5
URBAN WATER, SEWAGE, & SOLID WASTE	4.5
URBAN TRANSPORTATION	1.0
WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT	7.9
NATURAL RESOURCES	1.6
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT	1.4
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE	2.0
	65.0-67.4
	+ billion

If it is assumed that these or similar programs must be adopted before we can successfully negotiate the difficult road to peace and security, then we had better put the politicians to work at the earliest possible date, for it is clear that here is grist for a debate that will take decades. When the task is framed so that the political realities are largely ignored, as it is in *Disarmament and the Economy*, it is not surprising that the economic problems seem quite soluble. This tactic sweeps the "engineering details" under the political scientists' rug, and they, at least, should have no illusions about this.

Second, many analyses suggest that one of the most significant problems facing America today is automation. Even without disarmament, this nation is in for a great deal of trouble unless it is prepared to take drastic social and political action. Despite this distressing possibility, the authors of *Disarmament and the Economy* ignore the problem of automation almost completely. It is difficult to understand how anyone can claim to "provide hard answers on how we can afford to disarm and what happens to our economy when we dismantle our military machine" (a quote from the book jacket) and ignore what many people believe to be the most significant problem facing the American economy today. If these two problems—disarmament and automation—interact to produce an effect on the rate of unemployment far greater than the simple sum of the two, then they should be considered together, not in isolation.

Probably no other period in history has witnessed so intensive a search for a stable peace. The development of nuclear weapons has lent both urgency and universality to the quest. Peace today is the concern of every man. It is not surprising that men from many nations should address themselves to the topic, nor is it surprising that in the process they should discover not only different answers, but different problems as well. What is remarkable is not the differences in point of view but the fact that the new breed searching for peace appears to have fewer illusions and a far more realistic appreciation for the dimensions of the problem than disarmers of the past.

The Shelter Debate

STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL, by Thomas L. Martin and Donald C. Latham. University of Arizona Press. 389 pp. \$6.

Reviewed by

James E. McDonald

THE literature of civil defense has been largely polarized between two extremes: First, there have been many volumes and essays written on nuclear strategy and its civil defense

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implications, the authors all too often carrying out their discourse on an ethereal plane marked by few facts and figures other than occasional orders of magnitude of expected numbers of deaths. Secondly, there has flowed from local, state, and national civil defense agencies a hodgepodge of do-it-yourself pamphlets and brochures generally bearing the hand-marks of public relations staffs more concerned with infusing shelter living with the spirit of togetherness than in giving the reader a realistic picture of the horror that would be nuclear war and the complexities that really lie behind efforts to shelter any significant fraction of a large population against nuclear attack.

The scientifically trained have had recourse to such basic references as the Government Printing Office's *Effects of Nuclear Weapons* and a large literature of technical material on radiation hazards; but the concerned layman has, for the most part, been unable to find reliable information in the middle ground between the two poles of higher strategy and shelter togetherness. One recent book filling an important part of the gap is Ralph Lapp's *Kill and Overkill*. Now an important new book filling another part of that information gap has come along: Martin and Latham's *Strategy for Survival*.

Martin and Latham's book is the first detailed and thoroughly-documented analysis to be published on the grave difficulties and heavy costs that are implicit in any shelter program adequate to meet the innumerable difficulties posed by modern weapons systems. At the present time, when a new round of Congressional hearing and committee studies is being directed towards carrying out the Kennedy Administration's avowed policy of promoting a large national shelter program, *Strategy for Survival* will be an invaluable reference for both proponents and opponents.

It is, indeed, this latter feature that is the book's real strength. Although its authors are in favor of a big Federally-supported shelter program, and although the book does include some strongly worded advocacy of this view, the bulk of the volume is an impartially presented analysis of the entire



Parker in The Washington Post

**"Well, It's Back to the
Peace Movement . . . That Last
Rain Made Our Shelter Radioactive"**

civil defense problem that puts in terms understandable to the intelligent layman the hard facts of weapons effects and shelter engineering. I know of no comparable reference to which one may turn to find so extensive a compilation of the data on weaponry and shelters that must be grasped before one can claim to understand the background of the great shelter debate.

The book begins with a resume of numbers and performance-characteristics of American and Soviet missiles and air force capabilities and translates these into possible attack patterns without falling off the deep edge of war-gamesmanship. Then seven chapters spell out (for the reader not quite up to doing his own digging in *Effects of Nuclear Weapons*) the physics and physiology of blast, fire, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons, concluding with reference material on bacteriological and chemical warfare. Another section examines targeting considerations, culminating in a tabular listing of the authors' prediction of likely attack patterns on 303 American cities. There are chapters that itemize the engineering and logistic, and to some extent the psychological, problems of shelter design. Finally, a long array of technical appendices cover the finer points of topics treated in more general terms in the main portion of the book.

In recommending the book as a reliable source-book on civil defense, I

could not join Martin and Latham in their final conclusions, nor could I say that they have presented anything like adequate rebuttals to the many psychological and political objections to our embarking on a huge national shelter-building program. Two of their chapters look briefly at some of these objections; but, aside from asseverations that it is only common sense for us to take all possible precautions about the uncertainties of our nuclear future, the authors add little to non-scientific aspects of the shelter debate.

They make one point in this general area, however, which struck me as arresting: They examine the anti-shelter argument which asserts that a shelter-construction program would "prepare the people for acceptance of thermonuclear war as an instrument of national policy." Martin and Latham reject this on the grounds that "both the people and the government of the United States *have* accepted it." The President's declarations of intent to use American missiles against Russia, if necessary, in the heat of the Cuban crisis, and the "overwhelming support of the American people" that these declarations evoked, are cited by the authors as evidence that "we *have* accepted it." Although I am unaware that anyone else has so interpreted the rise and fall of the Cuban crisis, I must confess that reflection leads me to believe that their point is probably correct and that it does go far towards neutralizing that one anti-shelter argument.



However, what Martin and Latham say almost nothing about in their book is how to anticipate the far-reaching effects of a vast shelter construction program on our attitudes towards all of the yet-untried peaceful alternatives that compete for our attention, resources, and national energy as we try to resolve cold-war dilemmas. And because their book is not even aimed at assessing such deeper and subtler aspects of the shelter question, I cannot easily accept their final recommendations for a multi-billion dollar shelter program, and

neither will many other readers, I suspect.

But what those readers will certainly find in this book is a competent and thorough study of a wide range of technical aspects of civil defense. In an area where unsupported expression of opinion needs to be narrowed down as much as is possible, their clarifying contribution is most welcome and deserves to be widely read.

Solid Gold Burials

THE HIGH COST OF DYING, by Ruth Mulvey Harmer. Crowell-Collier Press. 256 pp. \$3.95.

THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH, by Jessica Mitford. Simon and Schuster. 333 pp. \$4.95.

Reviewed by

Sylvia H. MacColl

WHEN, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for eighty-five independent groups of people in twenty-three states to organize themselves in protest against the social and economic pressures of the funeral industry;

When "free choice of funeral" in accordance with personal taste and mature belief is effectively denied to the average American citizen if his desire happens to conflict with the profit-oriented "traditions" which have been carefully nurtured by the commercial burial and embalming interests;

When the spiritual comfort of religion is subordinated to the material "comfort" of elaborate caskets, cosmetic "restorations," and costuming for the dead, and "love" is supposed to be measured by the size of the undertaker's bill;

When these things have come to pass, it is time—it is more than time—that the facts behind "the high cost of dying" and "the American way of death" should be given thorough examination by the American public.

We owe a real debt of gratitude to Ruth Mulvey Harmer (the seed of her book appeared in an article with the same title in the March, 1961, issue of *The Progressive*) and to Jessica Mitford for the thorough research, penetrating analysis, and lively reporting which each has given to her ac-

count of present day American funeral practices. Much of the same material is necessarily covered in both volumes. Either will serve as a revelation to the average American citizen as well as to those who have been at least partially aware of the "full-fledged burlesque" which the funeral industry has presently become.

In addition to her skillful reporting of present day conditions, Ruth Mulvey Harmer, in *The High Cost of Dying*, has set her account in historical perspective. Four of her twelve chapters are devoted to the history and cultural significance of funeral rites and ceremonies over the ages. Her final chapters tell the story of "an American solution"—the cooperative efforts of the proliferating memorial and funeral societies to bring about a return to dignity, sanity, and economy in our farewells to the dead.

In contrast, Mrs. Mitford in *The American Way of Death* touches history and counteraction somewhat more briefly. Her special contribution is to conduct the reader on a full scale tour behind the scenes in the embalming room—a fantastic experience. We learn of the campaign of the florists to forbid publication of a family's request that flowers be omitted. The tax free status of astronomically profitable commercial cemeteries is explained. Documenting her account at every turn, the economics, the politics, the ethics, and the "science" of the funeral "professional" are made abundantly clear.

THE REVIEWERS

ROBERT H. DAVIS, a senior scientist with the System Development Corporation, has specialized in the arms control area for a number of years. JAMES E. McDONALD is a senior physicist in the University of Arizona's Institute of Atmospheric Physics. He has written for both scientific and popular journals. SYLVIA MacCOLL was educational director of the People's Memorial Association in Seattle for six years. Mrs. MacColl, a psychologist, has written a book, "Structure and Development of Phenomenal Reality," which will be published this fall. RICHARD DUDMAN, a member of the Washington staff of The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, has traveled extensively throughout Latin America. WILSON O. CLOUGH, professor emeritus of American Studies at the University of Wyoming, is the author of "Intellectual Origins of American National Thought." WILLIAM MCCANN reviews paperbacks regularly for *The Progressive*.

The implications of *The American Way of Death* are, indeed, "a grotesque reflection of the tendencies in today's American life that most disturb those who are concerned with [the cultural values and] well-being of our society."

The High Cost of Dying and *The American Way of Death* are crusading books in the best and most responsible tradition of American writing. They are informative without being prosy, frequently humorous without overstepping the bounds of good taste, concerned without the loss of objectivity in judgment. Answers are provided for almost all of the questions which most frequently trouble the man or woman suddenly faced with the responsibility of making dignified arrangements for the cremation or burial of one who is dear to him. Their publication is a service to the public.

A Long Look Back

THE RISE OF THE WEST: A HISTORY OF THE HUMAN COMMUNITY, by William H. McNeill. University of Chicago Press. 829 pp. \$12.50.

Reviewed by

Wilson O. Clough

WHEN John Locke proposed a new empirical psychology, he labeled it "a plain historical method"—that is, as a contemporary Dutch physicist (Gravesande) advised: "Lay aside all feigned hypotheses. The property of bodies cannot be known *a priori*. We must therefore examine the Body itself."

It was not long before history became subject to a similar reexamination, seeking through recorded data for order and "law." History in the past has been approached from many stances: nationalistic destiny, search for a divine plan, or by geometric or evolutionary analogies. Today, as the physical and biological sciences, with astronomy, approach a vast cosmic synthesis, it is but proper that history should draw on anthropology, archeology, political and social sciences, and the arts for a more solid view of man's oneness.

Whether William H. McNeill reasoned thus or not, such a statement